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DIVINE INTERVENTION: RE-EXAMINING THE "ACT OF GOD"
DEFENSE IN A POST-KATRINA WORLD
JOEL EAGLE*
INTRODUCTION
On August 29, 2005, the eleventh tropical storm and third hurricane of
the 2005 season, named Katrina by the National Hurricane Service,1 made
landfall at Buras, Louisiana as a slow-moving Category Three storm. 2
When all is said and done, Katrina will probably be the most costly and one
of the most deadly natural disasters the United States has ever experi-
enced.3 As is typical with tropical storms, Katrina caused significant wind
damage. Yet it was the subsequent flooding that caused the unprecedented
and unimaginable destruction that left the Gulf Coast, and particularly New
Orleans, reeling and forever changed. While roughly 1,800 people lost their
lives in the storm,4 the "victims" of Katrina far exceed the number ex-
pressed in the death toll. At least four hundred thousand residents were
* J.D. Candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, 2007. B.A.,
Marketing, University of Iowa, 2003. The author thanks Professor Dan Tarlock for his assistance, and
extends special thanks to Professor Keith Harley, Executive Notes and Comments Editor Andrew
Merrick, and Editor-in-Chief Kathryn Vikingstad for their constant, valuable insight and guidance
throughout the writing of this note.
1. For each year, there is a pre-approved list of names for tropical storms and hurricanes. These
lists have been generated by the National Hurricane Center since 1953. Hurricanes are named alpha-
betically from the list in chronological order. Thus the first tropical storm or hurricane of the year has a
name that begins with "A" and the second is given a name that begins with "B." The lists contain names
that begin from A to W, but exclude names that begin with a "Q" or "U." Nat'l Hurricane Ctr., Nat'l
Weather Serv., Worldwide Tropical Cyclone Names [hereinafter Nat'l Hurricane Ctr., Names],
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/aboutnames.shtml (last visited Aug. 14, 2006).
2. RICHARD D. KNABB ET AL, NAT'L HURRICANE CTR., TROPICAL CYCLONE REPORT:
HURRICANE KATRINA 1 (2005) [hereinafter KNABB ET AL.], available at http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/
pdf/TCR-AL 122005_Katrina.pdf.
3. The Great Storm of 1900 that hit Galveston had long been considered the worst natural event
in U.S. history. The storm killed over 6,000 of the 38,000 living on the island city, and roughly one-
third of the city was leveled. Galveston.com, History of Galveston Island, http://www.galveston.com/
history/ (last visited Aug. 14, 2006).
4. As of July 7, 2006, nearly 1600 were reported deceased in Louisiana alone. LA. DEP'T OF
HEALTH AND HosPs., REPORTS OF MISSING AND DECEASED: JULY 7, 2006 (2006), available at
http://www.dhh.louisiana.gov/offices/page.asp?ID=192&Detail=5248. As of December 14, 2005, over
230 were reported dead in Mississippi, Mississippi's Invisible Coast, SUN HERALD, Dec. 14, 2005,
http://www.sunherald.com/mld/sunherald/13402585.htm.
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displaced, 5 families' homes swept away or suffered massive flood damage.
Businesses, schools, and sports stadiums were laid to waste. The cleanup
and eventual rebuilding of New Orleans will certainly make Katrina the
most costly hurricane in U.S. history, with preliminary estimates of $75-
$80 billion in damages.6
One of the most immediate and pressing concerns, however, is the
devastating environmental impact of Hurricane Katrina. In New Orleans,
oil spills and hazardous waste releases have contaminated the city and sur-
rounding parishes, raising grave safety concerns in allowing residents to
return to their homes. 7 Off-shore oil refineries, oil and chemical plants in
and around the city, pesticides, household cleaning products, and sewage,
not to mention contamination from human waste and the rotting bodies of
those who died in the days and weeks after Katrina, have revived the use of
an oft-quoted phrase regarding a contaminated New Orleans: "toxic
gumbo."'8 The cleanup task is daunting, but the pursuit to rehabilitate New
Orleans and the rest of the Gulf Coast into a safe place to live must not be
taken lightly. Governments and policy-makers at all levels must plan not
only for the inevitable reality of future hurricanes; the more critical and
immediate inquiry arising from this disaster is how to address the effects of
oil and hazardous waste releases contaminating the numerous sites in the
region.
Hurricane Katrina and the subsequent flooding in New Orleans and
along the Gulf Coast will trigger a number of federal environmental stat-
utes. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 ("FWPCA," com-
monly known as the Clean Water Act ("CWA")), provides for federal
pollution removal costs associated with oil spills.9 The Oil Pollution Act of
199010 ("OPA") established a comprehensive oil spill response and liability
framework, with the goal of strengthening CWA measures for oil spill pre-
vention, designed, at least in part, in response to the monumental disaster of
5. Peter Whoriskey, Katrina Displaced 400,000, Study Says, WASH. POST, June 7,2006, at A12.
6. KNABB ETAL., supra note 2, at 12.
7. Rep. Jerrold Nadler (D-N.Y.) said this: "That entire area has to be cleaned up before people
move back in. You could have tens of thousands of people getting seriously ill." Katharine Miesz-
kowski & Mark Benjamin, Toxic Gumbo: Katrina's Environmental Legacy, SPEIGEL ONLINE, Oct. 6,
2005, http://www.spiegel.de/intemational/0, 1518,378296,00.html.
8. Reporter Ron Nixon used the phrase "toxic gumbo" to describe the noxious mix of pollutants
coursing through Louisiana, long before Hurricane Katrina. See Ron Nixon, Toxic Gumbo: In the
"Cancer Belt, " Louisiana Black Communities Fight Industrial Polluters, SEEINGBLACK.COM, Apr. 9,
2001, http://www.seeingblack.com/x04090l/toxic-gumbo.shtml.
9. 33 U.S.C. § 132 1(c) (2000).
10. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761.
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the Exxon Valdez. 11 The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA") was enacted to address
the threats to human health and the environment from abandoned hazard-
ous waste disposal sites and specific hazardous substance releases. 12 All
three statutes will be key instruments for environmental response and
remediation actions in the Gulf Region following Katrina.
The OPA, CWA, and CERCLA use identical or similar language, im-
posing strict liability on parties responsible for oil spills, releases, or threat-
ened releases of hazardous substances.13 Likewise, courts have consistently
interpreted liability under these statutes as strict in order to achieve the
statutes' broad remedial purposes. 14 However, a narrow and exclusive set
of affirmative defenses are available to potentially responsible parties
("PRPs") looking to avoid what may otherwise be extraordinary cleanup
costs. 15 Parties may avoid liability if they can
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the release or threat of
release of a hazardous substance and the damages resulting therefrom
were caused solely by (1) an act of God; (2) an act of war; (3) an act or
omission of a third party ... ;16 or (4) any combination of the foregoing
paragraphs. 17
Of particular relevance to Hurricane Katrina will be the act of God de-
fense. Congress defines an act of God as "an unanticipated grave natural
disaster or other natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable, and
irresistible character, the effects of which could not have been prevented or
11. See 136 CONG. REc. 22283, 22291 (1990) (statement of Rep. Fields). Congressman Fields
stated that "the primary goal of this legislation is to prevent oilspills from occurring in the future. We
must make every effort to ensure that accidents like the Exxon Valdez and the Mega Borg do not happen
again and that our waterways are free from the ravages of oil." Id.
12. See Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000)).
13. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(l)-(3); 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). All of these statutes
state in similar language that a party is responsible notwithstanding any other provision of law, and
subject only to the defenses set forth in the statute.
14. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985); Lincoln Props.,
Ltd. v. Higgins, 823 F. Supp. 1528, 1539 (E.D. Cal. 1992).
15. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(1)-(4); 33 U.S.C. § 2703(a)(l)-(3); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(I)-(4).
16. This defense applies when the third party is
other than an employee or agent of the defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in
connection with a contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with the defendant
(except where the sole contractual arrangement arises from a published tariff and acceptance
for carriage by a common carrier by rail), if the defendant establishes by a preponderance of
the evidence that (a) he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance concerned,
taking into consideration the characteristics of such hazardous substance, in light of all rele-
vant facts and circumstances, and (b) he took precautions against foreseeable acts or omis-
sions of any such third party and the consequences that could foreseeably result from such
acts or omissions.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(I)-(4) (emphasis added).
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avoided by the exercise of due care or foresight."' 18 Not surprising in light
of the statutes' remedial purposes and strict liability standards, although the
defense has been available for nearly three decades, there is not a single
case on record where a court has granted an otherwise liable party relief by
accepting the act of God defense. While not explicitly breaking down the
defense into specific elements, courts have decided act of God cases based
on the following criteria: (1) whether the event was a grave natural disas-
ter/phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable, and irresistible character; (2)
whether the event was anticipated; (3) whether the event was the sole cause
of the release; and (4) whether the effects of the event could have been
prevented or avoided by the exercise of due care or foresight. 19 The first
element is beyond the control of a PRP, while a PRP has at least partial
control over the last three elements.
It will take years to adequately analyze, plan for, and finally clean up
contaminated sites, ensuring that Katrina-related litigation will last for dec-
ades. This note will focus on oil and hazardous substance releases from
facilities in the Gulf Region caused by Hurricane Katrina and will describe
how, when the time comes, invocations of the CWA, OPA, and CERCLA
act of God defense should be analyzed. Although the defense has never
succeeded, the monumental size and destruction of Katrina presents new
opportunities to prove an act of God has occurred. However, the note will
conclude that, notwithstanding the exceptional devastation brought about
by the storm, the statutory act of God defense should only apply to the most
extraordinary of situations. A hurricane in the Gulf Region, such as
Katrina, would not and should not qualify as one of those situations.
Part I will describe three of the relevant federal statutes and the stan-
dards of liability assigned, and summarize how cleanups after releases are
traditionally effectuated. Part II will describe Hurricane Katrina and the
subsequent damage in more detail, and will then compare Katrina to previ-
ous natural disasters in both magnitude and effect. Part III will break down
the act of God defense into elements based on how courts have analyzed it
in the past and, applying those elements to Hurricane Katrina, reach the
conclusion that the storm does not qualify as an act of God under the statu-
tory definition. Specifically, although Hurricane Katrina was one of the
most intense and destructive storms in recorded history, it was anticipated
on numerous levels. PRPs will also be challenged to establish that the hur-
18. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(1); 42 U.S.C. § 9601(1). The OPA and CERCLA definitions of "act of God"
are identical. The CWA definition of "act of God" simply states "an act occasioned by an unanticipated
grave natural disaster." 33 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(12).
19. See infra Part Ill.
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ricane was the sole cause of the release and that due care and foresight
were exercised. Part IV will discuss the policy rationale in favor of denying
the defense and holding parties financially liable for cleanup costs.
I. BACKGROUND OF RELEVANT ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES
Three of the major federal environmental statutes that Hurricane
Katrina will likely trigger are the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), 20 the Oil
Pollution Act ("OPA"),21 and the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA"). 22 Each Act prescribes the
actions, in accordance with the National Contingency Plan ("NCP"), that
must be taken in an emergency when oil or hazardous substances are in-
volved.23 The NCP was originally established by the Clean Water Act, with
the purpose of providing "efficient, coordinated, and effective action to
minimize damage from oil and hazardous substance discharges, including
containment, dispersal, and removal of oil and hazardous sub-
stances ... "24 The OPA and CWA deal with removal costs and damages
resulting from an incident in which oil is discharged into navigable waters
or adjoining shorelines or the exclusive economic zone,25 while CERCLA
provides for the cleanup of sites contaminated by hazardous substances as
defined by the Act. 26
A. Standard of Liability: Strict
Congress explicitly intended liability under CWA, OPA, and
CERCLA to be strict, where the absence of fault or the exercise of due care
alone is not a defense.27 All three statutes, in similar language, provide that,
notwithstanding any other provisions or rule of law and subject only to the
defenses set forth in the statute, each responsible party for a vessel or a
20. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387.
21. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761.
22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675.
23. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d)(4) ("[T]he removal of oil and hazardous substances and actions to
minimize damage from oil and hazardous substance discharges shall, to the greatest extent possible, be
in accordance with the National Contingency Plan."); 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(1)(B)(including removal
costs "incurred by any person for acts taken by the person consistent with the National Contingency
Plan"); 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a) (requiring the President to "revise and republish the national contingency
plan for the removal of oil and hazardous substances,... to reflect and effectuate the responsibilities
and powers" under CERCLA in addition to those matters specified in the CWA).
24. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d)(2).
25. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (CWA); 33 U.S.C. § 2701 (OPA).
26. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(14), 9607.
27. See S. REP. No. 96-848, at 34 (1980) (CWA); Apex Oil Co., Inc. v. United States, 208 F.
Supp. 2d 642, 652 (E.D. La. 2002) (OPA and CERCLA).
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facility from which oil or hazardous substances is discharged is liable for
removal costs and damages. 28 Section 9601(32) of CERCLA provides that
liability "shall be construed to be the standard of liability" under the Clean
Water Act,29 which the courts have consistently determined to be strict
liability.30 OPA legislative history also relates back to the CWA standard
of liability:
The Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation Act of 1989 continues to
rely on Section 311 of the Clean Water Act as the basic law providing
for cleanup authority, for penalties for spills and failure to notify of
spills, and, by adopting the standard of liability under section 311 as the
standard of liability under this Act, for liability of dischargers for
cleanup costs for the discharge of oil. That standard of liability has been
repeatedly determined to be strict, joint and several liability. 31
CERCLA case law has followed suit, consistently holding that the
statute is one of strict liability.32 While it is clear that the standard of liabil-
ity is strict under these statutes, it is not absolute.33
B. The Clean Water Act ("CWA ")
The Clean Water Act, originally passed in 1972 as the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act ("FWPCA"), 34 is a comprehensive statute aimed at
restoring and maintaining the chemical, physical and biological integrity of
the nation's waters. 35 Among the various programs under the CWA,
§ 1321, titled "Oil and hazardous substance liability," will apply to releases
during and after Katrina. Congress declared that it would be the policy of
the United States "that there should be no discharges of oil or hazardous
substances into or upon the navigable waters of the United States, adjoining
shorelines, or into or upon the waters of the contiguous zone .... -36
28. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(0(1)-(3); 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). All of these statutes
state in similar language that a party is responsible notwithstanding any other provision of law, and
subject only to the defenses set forth in the statute.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32).
30. See, e.g., Steuart Transp. Co. v. Allied Towing Corp., 596 F.2d 609, 613 (4th Cir. 1979).
31. S. REP. No. 101-94, at I1, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 732-33.
32. See, e.g., Apex Oil, 208 F. Supp. 2d at 652 ("Liability under the OPA and CERCLA is strict,
and the absence of fault, or the exercise of due care is not a defense." (footnote omitted)).
33. See infra Part III (discussing the elements that must be satisfied to succeed on the act of God
defense).
34. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No.95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified as 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-
1387 (2000)).
35. 33 U.S.C. § 125 1(a).
36. 33 U.S.C. § 132 1(b)(l).
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There are a number of methods Congress authorized for the cleanup of
a discharge. The CWA provides for federal removal authority, including
the power to
[1] remove or arrange for the removal of a discharge, and mitigate or
prevent a substantial threat of a discharge, at any time; [2] direct or
monitor all Federal, State, and private actions to remove a discharge; and
[3] remove and, if necessary, destroy a vessel discharging, or threatening
to discharge, by whatever means are available.37
Under the CWA, the NCP also grants affected states the authority to re-
move such discharges and allows for reimbursement from the Oil Spill
Liability Trust Fund ("Fund")38 for reasonably incurred costs. 39 The CWA
also grants the President authority to require the United States Attorney
General to secure relief from any person or to take any other action neces-
sary to protect public health and the environment, including issuing a uni-
lateral administrative cleanup order.40 The CWA provides for the
imposition of civil and criminal penalties for unlawful discharges and for
the failure to carry out orders issued under the Act.4 1 Finally, under the
framework of the NCP, a responsible party may itself initiate and fund a
cleanup.42 Once a party has acted to remove released oil or hazardous sub-
stances, it may be entitled to the reasonable costs incurred in effecting the
removal by establishing one of the enumerated defenses in a suit against
the United States government in the Court of Federal Claims.43 Among
those is the act of God defense.
C. The Oil Pollution Act ("OPA')
Congress passed the Oil Pollution Act in 1990 in the wake of the
Exxon Valdez disaster at Prince William Sound, Alaska,44 in order to
amend and strengthen related existing laws, in particular the CWA. The
OPA retains many of the same elements as the CWA. Removal costs under
the OPA, for example, are referred to as all removal costs incurred under
37. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c)(1)(B)(i)-(iii).
38. I.R.C. § 9509 (2000).
39. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d)(2)(H).
40. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(e)(1).
41. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(c), 1321(b)(6)(A)-(B).
42. See 33 U.S.C. § 132 1(c)(3)(B).
43. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(i).
44. See Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (codified as 33 U.S.C.§§ 2701-2761); U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Exxon Valdez [hereinafter EPA, Exxon Valdez],
http://www.epa.gov/oilspill/exxon.htm (last visited Aug. 14, 2006).
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the CWA,45 and as stated above, the same language is used to establish
strict liability. 46 If the removal actions are consistent with the NCP, the
Fund 47 is available for payment of a number of costs, including removal
costs; the cost of assessing natural resource damages; the cost of "develop-
ing and implementing plans for the restoration, rehabilitation, replacement,
or acquisition of the equivalent of damaged resources"; and certain other
claims. 48 As with the CWA, recovery costs are available for responsible
parties if they can establish one of the defenses, one of which is again the
act of God defense. 49
D. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act ("CERCLA ")
Passed in 1980,50 CERCLA provides for the cleanup of sites contami-
nated by hazardous substances. 51 CERCLA grants the President authority
to respond to releases (or substantial threats of releases) of hazardous sub-
stances, or other substance that may present an imminent and substantial
danger to the public, in a number of ways, so long as they are consistent
with the NCP. The options include (1) acting to remove or arrange for the
removal of the substance; 52 (2) providing for remedial action;53 or (3) tak-
45. See 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(1) (stating that removal costs include those incurred under 33 U.S.C.
§ 132 1(c)-(d), (e), ()).
46. See supra Part I.A. See generally 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) ("Notwithstanding any other provision
or rule of law, and subject to the provisions of this Act, each responsible party... is liable for removal
costs and damages specified [in the Act] .....
47. I.R.C. § 9509 (2000).
48. 33 U.S.C. § 2712(a)(I)-(2). The Fund was suspended in 1993 because it reached its statutory
limit of $1 billion, was reinstated in July 1994 when the balance fell below the limit, and then expired at
the end of 1994. Nat'l Pollution Funds Ctr., U.S. Coast Guard, The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund,
http://www.uscg.mil/npfc/About%20Us/osltf.htm (last visited Aug. 14, 2006). However, in 2005 the
Energy Policy Act of 2005 reinstated the tax, which becomes effective in 2006. Pub. L. No. 109-58,
§ 1361, 119 Stat. 594, 1058.
49. 33 U.S.C. § 2708(a)(1).
50. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000)). In 1986 Congress passed the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act ("SARA"), and today the Act is concurrently known
as CERCLA, SARA, or Superfund. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-
9675).
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607. For CERCLA's definition of "hazardous substance," see 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(14) (providing an expansive and non-exhaustive listing of hazardous substances).
52. A "removal action" may be the cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances from the
environment, taking preventative action against a threatened release, and other actions necessary to
prevent the immediate threat to human health and the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23).
53. A "remedial action," on the other hand, contemplates a long-term, permanent remedy taken
instead of or in addition to a removal. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24).
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ing other response actions consistent with the NCP to protect public health
or welfare or the environment. 54
CERCLA presents a number of the same alternatives as the CWA to
accomplish its cleanup goals. The Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") may issue a unilateral administrative order directing a PRP to take
action and fund cleanup, or it may secure such an order through the federal
district court-commonly known as "106 orders. '55 An alternative method
is where the government cleans up the contaminated site and later sues the
PRP to recover the costs incurred-commonly known as a "107 cost recov-
ery." 56
Before the government attempts to collect from the PRP under section
107, cleanup activities may be funded by the Hazardous Substance Re-
sponse Trust,57 commonly known as the Superfund. 58 If the government is
successful in a suit against a PRP, the recovered costs are deposited back in
the Superfund.59 The other key channels of revenue for the Superfund tra-
ditionally came from two main sources: so-called dedicated taxes (on pe-
troleum, chemical feedstocks, and on corporate income) from industries
involved in the handling of substances that commonly triggered CERCLA,
and from general revenue taxes (the taxpayers). 60 However, dedicated taxes
expired at the end of 1995 and were not reauthorized, at which point the
government began dipping into the fund faster than it was being replen-
ished.61 The current administration has proposed to compensate for the lack
54. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1).
55. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act § 106, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9606. These orders are authorized by section 106 of CERCLA, hence the name "106 order."
56. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act § 107, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607. These suits are authorized by section 107 of CERCLA, hence the name "107 cost recovery."
Under section 107, any number or combination of parties may be liable for all removal and/or remedial
costs, any other necessary response costs consistent with the NCP, damage to natural resources, and the
costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out. Id.
57. I.R.C. § 9507 (2000).
58. CERCLA and the Superfund are often regarded as legislation gone wrong, due to a slew of
problems such as poor legislative drafting which makes the statute very difficult to interpret. See, e.g.,
John Copeland Nagle, CERCLA 's Mistakes, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1405 (1997) (discussing the
statutes' passing in a lame duck congress, along with the poor drafting, ambiguous and vague language,
and policy errors). See generally JONATHAN LEE RAMSEUR ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
SUPERFUND TAXES OR GENERAL REVENUES: FUTURE FUNDING ISSUES FOR THE SUPERFUND PROGRAM,
(2006) [hereinafter RAMSEUR ET AL.], available at http://ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/
06apr/RL31410.pdf (discussing the failure to reinstate dedicated taxes for Superfund and the resulting
insufficient fund balance).
59. See I.R.C. § 9507(b)(2), (4)-(5).
60. See RAMSEUR ETAL., supra note 58, at 2-3.
61. Id. at 3. By the end of 2003, "the fund's unobligated balance was zero, down from a high of
$3.8 billion in 1996." Id. at Summary.
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of dedicated tax revenue by increasing taxpayer contributions. 62 One argu-
ment for reinstating dedicated taxes is that the cost of cleanups at hazard-
ous waste sites and spills should be borne by the chemical and petroleum
industries and companies that profit from the sale or use of the hazardous
substances being cleaned up, not by ordinary taxpayers.63
Like the CWA, CERCLA provides for penalties in a civil as well as
criminal context. 64 Finally, as with the previous statutes, strict liability is
not absolute--establishing one of the four enumerated defenses will relieve
what would be an otherwise liable party. 65 The act of God defense is a
likely target for many businesses suffering releases from Katrina.66
II. NATURAL DISASTERS, THEN AND Now: HURRICANE KATRINA IN
CONTEXT
6 7
The following sections will review the 2005 Tropical Storm season
(section A), paying particular attention to Hurricane Katrina (section B)
and the actual environmental impacts on the region (Section C). It will then
compare Katrina to some of the most devastating and costly natural phe-
nomena since recordings began in the United States (section D), confirming
that this event not only affected millions of lives nationwide, but has be-
come one of the worst natural disasters in United States history. Although
Part II focuses on the destruction and fallen records from Hurricane Katrina
and the 2005 Season, its main purpose is to prepare the reader for the con-
clusion that, notwithstanding the great devastation, Hurricane Katrina is not
the type of unanticipated grave natural disaster that Congress envisioned to
relieve liability for oil or hazardous substances releases. While it may be
difficult, the magnitude of and emotion surrounding Katrina must not inter-
fere with or influence the analysis of the act of God defense.
62. In his fiscal year 2006 budget request, the President proposed to fund nearly all of the re-
quested $1.26 billion appropriation for the Superfund program through general revenues. Id. at Sum-
mary.
63. Id. at 3. The rationale of this "polluter pays" principle is supported by this note's conclusion
that the act of God defense should be very narrowly construed, and is discussed further infra Part IV.
64. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9603(b), 9609 (2000).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(1)-(4).
66. For a detailed analysis of the act of God defense, see infra Part 111.
67. Much of the information on the 2005 Tropical Storm season, including many of the records
set, was taken from The Weather Channel, Hurricane Central: The 2005 Season Is Finally Over (Jan. 7,
2006), http://www.weather.com/newscenter/tropical/. The National Hurricane Center, part of the Na-
tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, provides reports for each Tropical Storm. Much of the
information regarding Hurricane Katrina was provided by KNABB ET AL., supra note 2.
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A. 2005-06 Tropical Storm Season
Hurricane prediction has received significant attention in recent years,
both before and after the 2005-06 tropical storm season. While a divide has
formed in the debate over whether climate change and global warming
have impacted the strength of tropical storms, few experts proposed any
connection to the number of storms forming. After years of inaccurate
storm number predictions, experts were convinced that their forecast of six
to eight hurricanes for the. 2005 season would be accurate. 68 Hurricane
Katrina was the fifth of a record fifteen hurricanes in the season 69, breaking
the previous mark of twelve, 70 and nearly doubling the experts' forecasts.
By the end of the season, other records were shattered, including the previ-
ous records of twenty-one named storms (twenty-seven in 2005),71 three
major hurricanes (four in 2005), and the strongest hurricane in the Atlantic
Basin (Gilbert at 888 millibars (mb) 72 in 1998, surpassed in 2005 by Wilma
at 882 millibars).73 Although experts have not yet drawn conclusions, and
may never have a definitive answer, the debates rage on as to whether the
remarkable season was due to natural trends or human influence. 74 Taking
68. One day before Arlene began to form, a Wall Street Journal article discussed the difficulty in
hurricane forecasting and the ongoing debate among climatologists on different theories of prediction.
The article, almost comically (almost being the operative word), concludes "This year, [researchers']
forecasts are mostly in line-ranging from six to eight hurricanes. 'That would give you confidence we
all have it right,' says Christopher Landsea, an NOAA meteorologist. 'Either that,' he laughs, 'or we'll
[sic] all going to bomb."' Carl Bialik, In Hurricane Forecasting, Science is Far From Exact, WALL ST.
J. ONLINE, June 8, 2005, http://online.wsj.com/public/us.
69. Jeffrey R. Ambrose, Hurricane Season 2006: How Will it Affect America?, THE REAL TRUTH,
July-Aug. 2006, available at http://www.realtruth.org/articles/0404-hshwiaa.html.
70. The Weather Channel, supra note 67.
71. For the first time since storm naming began in 1953, the Greek alphabet had to be employed.
See Nat'l Hurricane Ctr., Names, supra note 1.
72. A millibar is a unit of atmospheric pressure equal to one one-thousandth of a bar. The average
atmospheric pressure at sea level is 1,013 millibars. Nat'l Weather Serv. Forecast Office, Nat'l Oceanic
& Atmospheric Admin., Weather Glossary, http://www.srh.noaa.gov/tsa/weather-glossary.html (last
visited Aug. 15, 2006).
73. The Weather Channel, supra note 67.
74. Disagreement is most pronounced between renowned hurricane scientist Dr. Greg Holland of
the National Center on Atmospheric Research, and Dr. William Gray, one of the most prominent hurri-
cane scientists, who has been studying storms for nearly fifty years. Dr. Holland's view represents a
growing belief among many top scientists that the extremely intense and destructive storms in recent
years may be explained in part by global warning caused by human activities. Conversely, Gray ar-
dently argues that natural factors, such as warming ocean temperatures resulting from natural, historical
trends, and upper-air currents that help push storms ashore, have caused the recent activity, and that
these natural phenomena will subside in the next few decades. Advancing the heated debate and contro-
versy (beyond an apparently intense feud among opposing camps) is that whenever one side offers
allegedly strong evidence in the form of scientific studies for a position, the opposing side presents its
own repudiations that the study is incorrect or that calculations are flawed. See Valerie Bauerlein,




the season as a whole, with Katrina as the centerpiece, PRPs may argue that
nothing could have prevented the releases that occurred during the season.
However, as we will see in Part III, even though the act of God defense
considers whether the effects could have been avoided by the exercise of
due care or foresight, proving this element alone will not lead to a success-
ful defense.
B. Hurricane Katrina
In combination the 2005-06 season was record setting, but from
roughly August 23-30, 2005, 75 Hurricane Katrina's combination of magni-
tude and destruction would leave all the other storms in its wake. The
tropical depression that would become Hurricane Katrina developed on
August 14, but it did not become a tropical storm and thus acquire the name
Katrina, until midday on August 24.76 At its worst, Katrina attained Cate-
gory Five strength at 150 knots.77 Before landfall in Louisiana, Katrina
weakened rapidly. Although news initially reported that Katrina made land-
fall as a Category Four hurricane, experts now estimate that Katrina made
landfall at Buras, Louisiana at roughly 125 miles per hour (mph), placing it
as a high-end Category Three hurricane. 78 After Katrina made landfall, the
sustained winds over most of New Orleans and Lake Pontchartrain likely
weakened to less than Category Three strength 79-from the data that was
gathered, the city experienced sustained surface winds of Category One or
Two strength.80
With wind speeds at well over 100 mph, it is not surprising that wind
damage was significant. 81 Yet it was the tremendous storm surge and levee
failure that caused the damage now associated with the disaster that is Hur-
ricane Katrina. The National Hurricane Center reports that even though the
intensity of the storm weakened significantly before making landfall, the
75. KNABB ET AL., supra note 2, at 1.
76. Id. at 1-2.
77. Id. at 3. See Hurricane Research Div., Atl. Oceanographic & Meteorological Lab., Frequently
Asked Questions [hereinafter AOML, FAQ], http://www.aoml.noaa.gov/hrd/tcfaq/DI.html (last visited
Aug. 15, 2006), for a breakdown of maximum sustained wind speeds at each category of storm. For
example, at over 156 miles per hour, or 136 knots, a hurricane is classified as Category Five.
78. Katrina Was Category 3, Not 4, CNN.coM, Dec. 21, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/
WEATHER/I2/21/katrina/. Category Three hurricanes range from Ill to 130 mph. See AOML, FAQ,
supra note 77.
79. KNABB ET AL., supra note 2, at 8.
80. Id. One must also keep in mind that hurricane winds increase in strength from the ground
upward to a few hundred meters, such that high-rise buildings were likely affected by greater sustained
winds than points directly below at ground level. Id.
8 1. Id. at 11. Windows in high-rise buildings in downtown New Orleans were blown out, and the
roof of the Louisiana Superdome was partially destroyed.
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size of the storm surge may be explained in part by the extraordinary wide
radius of the storm. 82 Also adding to the surge was the fact that Katrina had
already generated massive swells at sea while still at Category Four and
Five strength. 83
C. Katrina-Related Releases and Environmental Effects
It is far too early to make conclusive statements about the actual de-
struction and long-term effects of Hurricane Katrina. More than half a year
later, cleanup and testing for environmental impacts are still in the very
early stages, 84 and hundreds of thousands of Gulf Coast residents were
directly impacted by the hurricane. 85 What is clear is that local, state, and
federal governments must work hand-in-hand to effectuate a cleanup that
will ensure a clean environment and health and safety to those residents
returning to the area. There are a number of environmental cleanup consid-
erations, including debris and waste disposal, 86 effects on previously con-
taminated (Superfund) sites, 87 and more directly associated with potential
act of God contentions, releases of oil and hazardous substances. 88
82. Id. at 9. For example, Hurricane Camille in 1969 followed a similar track as Katrina. Although
Camille was more intense, it was also more compact, and thus produced storm surges along a much
narrower path. Id.
83. See id. One particular buoy measured a peak significant height (defined as the average of the
one-third highest waves) of fifty-five feet at 1100 Coordinated Universal Time ("UTC") on August 29,
matching the largest ever measured by a National Data Buoy Center ("NDBC") buoy. Id.
84. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Response to 2005 Hurricanes: Frequent Questions [hereinafter
EPA, FAQ], http://www.epa.gov/katrina/faqs.htm (last visited Aug. 15, 2006). In emergency situations,
the United States EPA serves as lead agency for cleanup of hazardous waste releases, and continually
updates its website to reflect cleanup progress, identify health risks, and assess damage.
85. See Michelle Roberts, Katrina Homeless in Search of Trailers, SUNHERALD.COM, Aug. 8,
2006, http://www.sunherald.com/mld/sunherald/15223201.htm (stating that FEMA has "provided
housing assistance to more than 900,000 people regionwide since Katrina").
86. See ROBERT ESWORTHY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CLEANUP AFTER HURRICANE
KATRINA: ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS 1, 7 (2005) [hereinafter ESWORTHY ET AL.], available at
http://ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/05oct/RL33115.pdf. Debris includes "construction materials, dam-
aged or destroyed buildings, sediments, 'green' wastes (e.g., trees, limbs, leaves, and shrubs), 'white'
goods (appliances such as refrigerators), personal property, and vehicles." Id. at 7.
87. See id. at 13. The most contaminated sites in the United States are placed on the National
Priority List ("NPL") and are commonly known as Superfund sites. There are fifteen Superfund sites
located in the Katrina-affected area of Louisiana, six in Alabama, and three in Mississippi. Id.; see also
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Summary of Assessments at Superfund National Priority List Sites,
http://www.epa.gov/katrina/superfund.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2006) (providing a summary of the
NPL sites affected by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita). The site of greatest initial concern was the Agricul-
ture Street Landfill in New Orleans, which was inundated with three feet of floodwater from Katrina.
ESWORTHY ET AL., supra note 86, at 14. The site was previously remediated and partially deleted from
the NPL and, at the time of Katrina, was fenced off and covered with two feet of soil. Although the
post-Katrina evaluation at the site is not complete, early sampling indicated that lead levels were not
above the range that existed after the remedial action, and initial and secondary inspections reveal that
the landfill cap was not compromised. See id.; U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Agriculture Street Landfill I
(June 6, 2006), http://www.epa.gov/katrina/superfund.html (follow "Agriculture Street Landfill, Or-
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There have been a number of reports of hazardous waste releases as a
result of Katrina, and in the coming months and years more will certainly
surface. The U.S. EPA website continues to report on the status of areas
under investigation and cleanup. 89 While hazardous waste releases from
chemical storage facilities may not have been as severe as initially feared,90
releases of oil appear to have been significant. More than forty releases
from Gulf Coast refineries and oil tanks have been reported,91 at least five
of which were large spills. 92 The largest appears to be at Bass Enterprises
Production Company in Cox Bay, where approximately 3.77 million gal-
lons were released.93 Another Bass Enterprises facility at Point a la Hache
sustained damage to above ground tanks, with approximately 461,000 gal-
lons of oil being discharged. 94 At Shell Pipeline in Pilot Town, approxi-
mately 1.1 million gallons of crude oil was found leaking from an above
ground storage tank.95 The Chevron Empire Terminal facility at Buras,
Louisiana (Hurricane Katrina's point of landfall) experienced storage tank
damage resulting in spillage of 991,000 gallons of oil.96 Including the Mur-
phy spill discussed below, the sum of the five largest Katrina-related spills
is roughly 7.5 million gallons. At 11 million gallons the Exxon Valdez spill
of 1989 remains the largest single spill in U.S. history.97
leans Parish" hyperlink). CERCLA requires financial assurance through the establishment of a Post-
Closure Liability Fund, so that any additional remedial action will be funded by the party initially
responsible for cleanup. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(k) (2000).
88. See ESWORTHY ET AL., supra note 86, at 11.
89. See EPA, FAQ, supra note 84. As the website indicates, there is still work to be done in
determining the extent of releases. For example, as of August 17, 2006 (roughly one year after Hurri-
cane Katrina hit), in response to the question, "When will we know about the number of oil spills and
how many gallons were likely dumped into the flooded areas, the bay and the river?" the EPA states,
"We expect that it will take some time before we know the full extent of the impacts of oil spills result-
ing from Hurricane Katrina." Id.
90. See Katrina Floodwaters Not as Toxic to Humans as Previously Thought, Study Says,
SCIENCE DAILY, Oct. 12, 2005, http://www.sciencedaily.corn/releases/2005/l0/051012082827.htm.
91. Mieszkowski & Benjamin, supra note 7.
92. See Miguel Llanos, 44 Oil Spills Found in Southeast Louisiana, MSNBC.COM, Sept. 19, 2005,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9365607/. A large spill is over 100,000 gallons, a medium is between





97. See EPA, Exxon Valdez, supra note 44. The Valdez may arguably have been more manage-
able because, unlike the scattered spills in the Gulf Region, the Valdez release occurred in only one
area. The Valdez disaster is the single worst oil spill in U.S. history, with effects still lingering over 15
years later. See Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Tr. Council, Habitat: Injured Resources and Services,
http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/Habitat/injuredresources.htm (last visited Aug. 16, 2006).
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One of the most publicized spills took place at the Murphy's Oil Cor-
poration at their Meraux Refinery in St. Bernard Parish, Louisiana. 98 The
Murphy facility, surrounded by a residential neighborhood, released over
one million gallons of mixed crude oil. 99 The U.S. EPA and the U.S. Coast
Guard have joint responsibility for cleanup: the Coast Guard is responsible
for supervising Murphy's removal of oil releases in the "canals, tank farm
containment area, neighborhood streets and storm drains"; while the EPA is
working with the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality in su-
pervising Murphy's cleanup of oil releases in publicly accessible residential
areas such as parks, school yards, roads, highway median strips, and side-
walks. 100 Although Murphy has already paid more than $50 million to af-
fected homeowners, as well as spent more than $13 million on cleaning up
public property and another $4 million to clean up private property,10' it
has recently been named defendant in the first federal case stemming from
a Katrina-related release. 102 While Murphy blames the release on Katrina,
the Plaintiffs seek to find Murphy negligent for not adequately securing the
oil storage tank that leaked after being dislodged from its foundation by
floodwaters. 103 While this action is currently in the form of negligence, and
the damages sought are for property damage and personal injury, this is
precisely the type of situation in which the act of God defense may later be
raised to recover cleanup costs. With the number of large, medium, and
small oil spills that have been reported, in addition to chemical releases that
have not yet been publicized, the number of suits will begin to mount in the
coming months and years.
D. Katrina in Context
Not only was Katrina the most devastating of the 2005 season, when
compared to other hurricanes in recorded U.S. history, Katrina is one of the
most deadly and destructive hurricanes of all time. Even still, the facts dis-
cussed below do not change the analysis of the statutory act of God de-
fense. The defense does not only consider magnitude of the event or
98. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Response to 2005 Hurricanes: Murphy Oil Spill,
http://www.epa.gov/katrina/testresults/murphy/index.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2006).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Oil Company: Katrina Spill Victims Got $50m, MSNBC.coM, Jan. 13, 2006,
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/10838641/.
102. See Turner v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 597 (E.D. La. 2006). The case involves
twenty-seven consolidated class action lawsuits filed by residents of St. Bernard Parish, Louisiana.
Plaintiffs are homeowners and residents in the area near the oil refinery, and they have brought a variety
of claims for property damage and personal injury, among others, resulting from the discharge.
103. Oil Company: Katrina Spill Victims Got $50m, supra note 101.
2007]
CHICAGO-KENT LA W REVIEW
severity of destruction. As easy as it may be to make broad conclusions
based on these figures, the defense is stronger than any single element.
In terms of economic damage, two previous storms are well-regarded
as being the most costly. In modem times, 1992's Hurricane Andrew cost
nearly $44 billion in 2004 dollars. 104 At more than twice that of Andrew,
the famous unnamed 1926 storm that destroyed much of Southern Florida
would have cost over $100 billion in 2004 dollarsl 05-thus becoming the
most costly storm of all time. The American Insurance Services Group
estimates that Katrina caused roughly $38 billion of insured property dam-
age. 106 It is generally assumed that total damages will be double that of
insured losses, bringing the total to roughly $75 billion, well in excess of
Hurricane Andrew. 10 7 While $75 billion is on the moderate end, other es-
timates have ranged up to $200 billion.108 If this higher estimate proves
true, Katrina would clearly be the most costly natural disaster in U.S. his-
tory.
In terms of human casualty, the deadliest hurricane was the Great
Galveston storm of 1900, a Category Four storm that annihilated much of
the community, killing between 6,000109 and 8,000 people. I10 A far distant
second was the 1928 Southeast Florida/Lake Okeechobee Hurricane that
claimed 1,836 lives."' At nearly 1,400, Katrina would be the third most
deadly U.S. hurricane of all time. 112 Keeping in mind the over 6,000 still
missing, however, Katrina will likely surpass the 1928 storm and may also
rival the great Galveston storm of 1900.113
104. Nat'l Hurricane Ctr., Nat'l Weather Serv., Costliest U.S. Hurricanes 1900-2004 (Adjusted),
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pastcost2.shtml (last visited Aug. 14, 2006).
105. ERIC S. BLAKE ET AL., NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., THE DEADLIEST,
COSTLIEST, AND MOST INTENSE UNITED STATES TROPICAL CYCLONES FROM 1851 TO 2005, at tbl.3b
(2006), available at http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/DeadliestCostliest.shtml (ranking storms using 2004
inflation, population, and wealth normalization).
106. KNABB ETAL., supra note 2, at 12.
107. Id.
108. See Historic Hurricanes, http://www.hurricaneville.com/historic.html (last visited Aug. 14,
2006).
109. Galveston.com, supra note 3.
110. Nat'l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., Galveston Storm of 1900,
http://www.noaa.gov/galveston1900/ (last visited Aug. 14, 2006). Although there have been significant
advancements in technology and warning measures, the U.S. Weather Bureau, the predecessor the
NOAA's National Weather Service, did issue warnings, which were unheeded by many who were
curious to see the tremendous waves. Id.
111. JERRY D. JARRELL ET AL., NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., THE DEADLIEST,
COSTLIEST, AND MOST INTENSE UNITED STATES HURRICANES FROM 1900 TO 2000, at tbl.2 (2001)
[hereinafter JARRELL ET AL.], available at http://www.aoml.noaa.gov/hrd/Landsea/deadly/.
112. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
113. The National Hurricane Center points to two hurricanes in 1893 that might have been directly
responsible for more fatalities than Katrina: one hit the southeast Louisiana barrier island of Cheniere
Caminanda, killing roughly 2,000, and a second hit Georgia and South Carolina and killed between
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While storm intensity or strength is often generally thought of in terms
of category (ranked by miles per hour), the most accurate representation of
storm intensity is by central barometric pressure; the lower the pressure, the
more intense the storm is likely to be. 114 While there is some correlation
between barometric pressure readings and intensity, there is no hard and
fast rule. At just below the Category Four threshold, Katrina's Buras, Lou-
isiana landfall intensity, in terms of category, was less than other hurricanes
with comparable minimum pressures. 115 However, at 920 mb, Hurricane
Katrina became one of the most intense hurricanes, based on barometric
pressure, at U.S. landfall on record. It places third in that regard, trailing
only Hurricane Camille in 1969 (909 mb) and the Labor Day hurricane
hitting the Florida Keys in 1935 (892 mb), the latter of which stands as the
lowest central pressure of any U.S. storm at landfall in recorded history. 116
Although the statistics may be alarming, the following discussion of the act
of God case law will show that statistics alone will not save PRPs from
liability.
III. ACT OF GOD JURISPRUDENCE
Hurricanes are one of the most destructive natural phenomena to af-
fect the United States, and by this point there is no question that Katrina
ranks as one of the worst hurricanes in recorded times. Although PRPs will
surely argue this fact when raising an act of God defense, the legislative
history, plain text, and courts' interpretation of the defense will likely stand
as insurmountable barriers to a successful defense.
Congress defines an act of God as "an unanticipated grave natural dis-
aster or other natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable, and irre-
sistible character, the effects of which could not have been prevented or
avoided by the exercise of due care or foresight." l 7 The defense applies
only if the party can show by a preponderance of the evidence that the act
1,000 and 2,000 people. KNABB ET AL., supra note 2, at 11. Beyond the uncertainty in the number of the
deaths in the Galveston storm, death tolls from other hurricanes striking at least three-quarters of a
century ago are not terribly accurate. In any event, Katrina is hands down the most deadly hurricane
since 1928.
114. Doyle Rice, Hurricane Katrina Was Weaker than First Thought at Landfall,
USATODAY.COM, Dec. 22, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/weather/hurricane/2005-12-20-katrina-
strengthx.htm.
115. KNABB ET AL., supra note 2, at 7. An example is Hurricane Andrew, which came ashore as a
Category Five, but central pressure measured 922 mb, and thus was "less intense" than Hurricane
Katrina. See JARRELL ET AL., supra note 11l, at tbl.4.
116. KNABB ET AL., supra note 2, at 7.
117. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(1) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 9601(1) (2000). The OPA and CERCLA definitions
of "act of God" are identical. The CWA definition of "act of God" simply states "an act occasioned by
an unanticipated grave natural disaster." 33 U.S.C. § 1321(12).
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of God was the sole cause of the release. 18 As discussed above, Congress
created an uphill battle for PRPs by establishing a strict liability framework
for cleanup under these statutes.119 Yet, in addition to the heavy burden
imposed by strict liability, courts have construed the defenses even more
narrowly. Courts have analyzed the defense in terms of four elements: (1)
whether the event was a grave natural phenomenon of an exceptional, in-
evitable, and irresistible character; (2) whether the event was anticipated;
(3) whether the event was the sole cause of the release; and (4) whether the
effects of the event could have been prevented or avoided by the exercise
of due care or foresight. The first element is beyond the control of a PRP,
while the PRP has at least partial control over the last three elements.
A. Element One-Characterizing the Event
The first element of the defense is beyond the control of the PRP, in
that the natural phenomenon must be of a sufficiently severe nature to
overcome otherwise strict liability. The statutory definition prescribes a
very general outline for what might constitute such an event: a "grave natu-
ral disaster or other natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable, and
irresistible character .... -1"20 Clearly Congress did not intend every "natu-
ral disaster" or "natural phenomenon" to be eligible for the act of God de-
fense. Indeed, by including the qualifying adjective "grave," Congress
seems to indicate a heightened level of severity.121 But beyond that gener-
alization, the text does not give much guidance in categorizing natural phe-
nomena/disasters. When the text is vague or ambiguous, other sources,
such as legislative history and case law interpretation, may be helpful to
clarify meaning. 122
CERCLA's legislative history, while sparse, does give some indica-
tion as to what Congress intended would (or would not) qualify as an act of
God for purposes of relieving liability. A 1986 House report during
deliberations for passage of SARA 123 states that
[t]he "act of God" defense is more nebulous, and many occurrences as-
serted as "acts of God" would not qualify as "exceptional natural phe-
nomenon." For example, a major hurricane may be an "act of God," but
118. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(1)-(3); 33 U.S.C. §2703(a)(1);42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(i).
119. See supra Part I.A.
120. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(1);42 U.S.C. § 9601(1).
121. See Sabine Towing & Transp. Co. v. United States, 666 F.2d 561, 565 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
122. See In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1342-44 (7th Cir. 1989) (discussing the proper use of
legislative history in interpreting statutes).
123. See supra note 50.
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* in an area (and at a time) where a hurricane should not be unexpected, it
would not qualify as a "phenomenon of exceptional character."' 124
While not dispositive of this element, this report indicates that, based on
the acknowledgement of hurricane occurrences, some in Congress believed
that the majority of hurricanes should not fall within the domain of the
statutory defense.
In line with the strict liability standard of the environmental statutes
and the legislative history, case law has held that the "grave natural disas-
ter.., of an exceptional, inevitable, and irresistible character" language
creates a very narrow exception. In Sabine Towing & Transportation Co. v.
United States, the natural phenomenon in question was a freshet condition
on the Hudson River-a sudden rise in the river level, coupled with an
increased rate of flow due to rain and the spring runoff of melted snow, that
is known to wash down sediment, gravel, logs, rocks, and other debris. 125
Sabine sought to recover the costs associated with cleaning up thirty to fifty
thousand gallons of oil released into the Hudson, when an allegedly un-
known object struck its vessel and created a twenty foot tear in the ship's
hull.126 In holding that the conditions did not constitute a grave natural
disaster, the court pointed to evidence at trial indicating that the flow rate
on the day of the incident was equaled or exceeded on twenty-five percent
of all days that year, and "[t]o contend that the freshet. . . was a disaster is
to contend that the Hudson is in a disaster condition one-quarter of the
time."127
A number of other courts have determined that the natural phenome-
non which caused the release of oil or hazardous substances did not rise to
the level contemplated by Congress. In United States v. Stringfellow, the
U.S. sued an array of PRPs due to releases and threats of release of hazard-
ous substances, including the owners and operators of a toxic waste dis-
posal site, the generators of waste at the site, and the transporters of waste
from the generators to the facilities. 128 The natural phenomenon in question
was heavy rains in two distinct years, which the defendants attempted to
qualify as an act of God under the definition found in CERCLA and
CWA. 129 The court was not persuaded, noting that the rains "were not the
124. H.R. REP. No. 99-253(IV), at 71 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3068, 3101. This
House report also speaks to Element Two, whether the phenomenon was "unanticipated."
125. 666 F.2d at 563.
126. Id. at 562-63.
127. Id. at 565.
128. 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1058 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
129. Id. at 1061.
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kind of 'exceptional' natural phenomena to which the narrow act of God
defense of section 107(b)(1) applies."1 30
In United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., defendant Alcan, an alu-
minum manufacturer, dumped a large amount of oily wastes containing
hazardous substances down an air shaft leading to a network of coal mines
that bordered the east bank of the Susquehanna River in Pittston, Pennsyl-
vania. 131 In September 1985, Hurricane Gloria struck the East Coast, and
approximately one hundred thousand gallons of the emulsion was dis-
charged into the Susquehanna River, which the EPA cleaned up at a cost of
roughly $1.3 million. 132 Alcan raised the act of God defense, for which the
court found little sympathy. The court in part held that, like in United
States v. Stringfellow, "heavy rainfall is not the kind of 'exceptional natural
phenomenon' to which the act of God exception applies."' 133 Alcan coun-
tered by arguing that the release was not simply the result of heavy rainfall,
but rather that a hurricane (Gloria) caused the release, and that this consti-
tuted a "grave natural disaster or phenomenon."' 134 Unfortunately the court
did not clarify by holding that the hurricane also did not rise to a sufficient
level of severity. Instead, as will be discussed further in Element Three
below, the court decided the issue by finding that "no reasonable factfinder
could conclude that Hurricane Gloria was the sole cause of the re-
lease .... ,,135
From all of these cases it is clear that the weather event must not sim-
ply be severe, unprecedented, or destructive. While there is no baseline
standard of severity for an event to be categorized as a "grave natural disas-
ter.., of an exceptional, inevitable, and irresistible character," 136 what is
clear is that neither the freshet condition in Sabine Towing, the heavy rains
in Stringfellow, nor the hurricane (Gloria) in Alcan Aluminum, 137 were of a
level great enough for the courts to deem this element satisfied.
Hurricane Katrina, however, may present parties with a stronger ar-
gument regarding this first element. There is no question that, in terms of
natural phenomena, a court will find Katrina more severe than seasonal
130. Id.
131. 892 F. Supp. 648, 651 (M.D. Pa. 1995).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 658. See generally Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. at 1061 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
134. Alcan, 892 F. Supp. at 658.
135. Id. (emphasis omitted).
136. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(1) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 9601(1) (2000).
137. Hurricane Gloria was in fact a severe Hurricane, ranking in the top 25 in minimum pressure at
942 mb. See JARRELL ET AL., supra note I 11, at tbl.4. The Alcan site, however, was not directly hit by




river flooding or even a very severe rain storm. And compared to other
U.S. hurricanes, as noted in Part II, Katrina was one of the most intense
hurricanes in a record setting year. The keys to satisfying the first element,
therefore, will be to show that Hurricane Katrina was not only much more
grave and exceptional than other natural phenomena from past act of God
cases, but one of the most exceptional hurricanes of all time. Even if a
court is persuaded as to this first element, the next element begins to indi-
cate why the act of God defense should not succeed in Katrina-related
cases.
B. Element Two-Foreseeability of the Event
The second element of the defense is drawn from the first part of the
statutory definition of an act of God: an "unanticipated" natural disas-
ter/phenomenon. 138 The legislative history of both CERLCA and the CWA
are clear on this point: if the storm was foreseeable, predicted, or not un-
usual at the time and place it occurred, the defense should not apply. A
1970 Congressional Report prior to passage of the CWA provides a short
yet concise discussion of Congress's take on the act of God:
The term "act of God" is defined to mean an act occasioned by an unan-
ticipated grave natural disaster.... [O]nly those acts about which the
owner could have had no foreknowledge, could have made no plans to
avoid, or could not predict would be included. Thus, grave natural disas-
ters which could not be anticipated in design, location, or operation of
the facility or vessel by reason of historic, geographic, or climatic cir-
cumstances or phenomena would be outside the scope of the owner's or
operator's responsibility. 139
As stated in Element One, CERCLA's legislative history also ad-
dresses the idea of a storm (the example specifically uses a hurricane) be-
ing unanticipated: "[A] major hurricane may be an 'act of God,' but in an
area (and at a time) where a hurricane should not be unexpected, it would
not qualify as a 'phenomenon of exceptional character."' 1 40 In sum, the
House reports prior to the passage of both the CWA and CERCLA con-
clude that if the hurricane was expected it would not be exceptional, and
imply that an unexpected storm may qualify as "exceptional."
The courts have often based their decision to deny the defense, at least
in part, on the fact that the phenomenon should have been anticipated, with
two trends emerging. The first involves storms occurring in a region and at
138. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(12); 33 U.S.C. § 2701(1); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(1) (emphasis added).
139. H.R. REP. No. 91-940 (1970) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2712, 2722.
140. H.R. REp. No.99-253(Iv), at 71 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3068, 3101,
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a time when they are known to occur. The second involves storms that
were actually forecasted, such that the responsible facility/vessel should
have prepared itself for the event. In Kyoei Kaiun Kaisha v. M/V Bering
Trader, a storm in Lost Harbor, Alaska led to the grounding of a ship con-
taining oil.141 The defendant raised the act of God defense in an attempt to
show that they were not liable for the cost of the Coast Guard's activities in
preventing a threatened oil spill from the grounded vessel. 142 The court
found that the defendants put forth no evidence that the weather on the
night of the storm could not have been foreseen, and further cited a Coast
Guard navigation guide for Alaska in effect at the time of the grounding. 143
The guide warned that weather in the region is characterized by "persistent
overcast skies, strong winds, and violent storms. ... "144
Other courts have rejected the act of God defense when the natural
phenomenon takes place in regions (and at times of year) when such events
are known to occur. In Sabine Towing, the Hudson River flooding case
discussed in Element One, the court held that the circumstances of the hull
damage were not unanticipated, noting that the "frequency of freshet condi-
tions on the Hudson and the danger that they cause are well known to those
who navigate the river." 145
A similar situation arose in Apex Oil Co., Inc. v. United States, 146 the
most recent case involving the act of God defense in an OPA context.
While Apex navigated a pushboat and oil barges on the Lower Mississippi
River during the 1995 floods, the captain, faced with a strong current and a
sharp bend in the river, chose to navigate past a bridge. The current over-
whelmed the barges and pushboat, which soon collided with the bridge,
releasing approximately 840,000 gallons of slurry oil into the river. 147
Apex accepted responsibility, funded removal activities (costing $2.7 mil-
lion), and after losing a claim for reimbursement from the National Pollu-
tion Funds Center ("NPFC"), sought judicial review. 148 In concluding that
the flood conditions did not constitute an act of God within the meaning of
the OPA, the court agreed with the NPFC conclusion that Apex could have
anticipated that spring floods would result in high river stages, and that
141. 795 F. Supp. 1054, 1055 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
142. Id. at 1055, 1056 n.2.
143. Id. at 1056 n.2.
144. Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).
145. Sabine Towing & Transp. Co., Inc. v. United States, 666 F.2d 561, 565 (Ct. CI. 1981).
146. 208 F. Supp. 2d 642 (E.D. La. 2002).
147. Id. at 645.
148. ld. at 645-46, 648.
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strong flood currents associated with the floods are not unusual and/or un-
anticipated. 149
The second type of case involves the storm being forecasted before the
release occurs. In United States v. M/V Santa Clara I, during a storm off
the New Jersey coast that was predicted by the National Weather Service
and known by the captain and crew of the vessel prior to departure, roughly
441 barrels of arsenic trioxide were lost overboard, and some 800 pounds
of magnesium phosphide spilled in the hold of the vessel. 150 The EPA is-
sued an administrative order directing the owners and operators of the ves-
sel to retrieve and dispose of the lost barrels of arsenic trioxide. After six
weeks and an estimated $5 million, the vessel owners recovered approxi-
mately 320 barrels. 151 Hoping to recover the response costs, the owner of
the vessel invoked the act of God defense. The court, however, was not
convinced, finding that even a poorly forecasted storm is not an act of God
because it was predicted and was avoidable. 152
Another important aspect of the foreseeability of a storm comes from
Liberian Poplar Transports, Inc. v. United States, another case in which a
severe but predicted storm caused a vessel to release oil into a river (the
Delaware).153 Liberian argued that the storm was unanticipated because it
was not "well forecasted, and was not visually foreseeable by the ship's
watch .... 1154 The court noted that "the [CWA] and the legislative history
do not subscribe to a subjective test for anticipation."' 155 "If the crew had
monitored the radio for weather conditions, they clearly could have antici-
pated and taken precautions against the storm," considering the National
Weather Service issued a Severe Thunderstorm Watch over an hour before
the storm hit and a Warning at least a half hour before the storm hit. 156
Therefore this element of the defense, and thus the entire defense, failed. 157
PRPs attempting to raise a successful act of God defense in Katrina-
related litigation will find it difficult to overcome the anticipation element.
In terms of geographic expectations, both the Atlantic and Gulf Regions of
the United States are well-known for their long hurricane seasons. No facil-
149. See id. at 656-57.
150. 887 F. Supp. 825, 830, 843 (D.S.C. 1995).
151. Id.at830-31.
152. See id. at 843 (citing Liberian Poplar Transp., Inc. v. United States, 26 C1. Ct. 223, 226 (CI.
Ct. 1992)).
153. 26 CI. Ct. at 224.
154. Id. at 226.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 224, 226.
157. See id.
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ity that deals with oil or hazardous substances in the region will succeed in
convincing a court that they were unaware of the strong possibility of a
tropical storm/hurricane disrupting operations. 158 Because facilities will be
unable to prove Katrina was unanticipated, the facilities had a duty to exer-
cise due care or foresight in anticipation of such events. In terms of ad-
vanced notice based on weather forecasting, the storm that developed into
Hurricane Katrina was well-forecasted, well before final landfall. 159 Be-
cause courts have held that warnings issued by the National Weather Ser-
vice as little as a half hour before a storm hits is sufficient to establish
anticipation, 160 it would be highly unlikely for a court to conclude that a
facility could not have tracked Katrina's development, beginning on Au-
gust 14 and reaching tropical storm intensity on August 24, four days be-
fore landfall in Louisiana. 161
One possible fact-specific opportunity to establish this element will be
for PRPs to show that, although they were carefully tracking the storm, an
unpredictable last-minute change in the hurricane's direction or level of
storm surge, rainfall, or flood level led to the release. Although these site
and fact-specific variations may exist, possibly satisfying Element Two, a
PRP will still face formidable challenges in showing that the hurricane was
the sole cause of the release (Element Three) and that the release could not
have been prevented or avoided through the exercise of due care or fore-
sight (Element Four).
C. Element Three-Sole Cause
The final two elements (sole cause and due care exercised), over
which a PRP has much more control, will be very fact-specific inquiries,
therefore allowing more room for successful argument. At the same time, it
is the fact-specific nature of these elements that has spelled doom for past
act of God invocations. The two elements are very much related (if a PRP
did not exercise due care or foresight, the storm would not be the sole cause
of the release), and the courts have labeled facts as relating to the sole
158. See generally TED STEINBERG, ACTS OF GOD: THE UNNATURAL HISTORY OF NATURAL
DISASTER IN AMERICA (2000) (discussing how decision-makers in the United States have literally
paved the way for greater loss of life and property from floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, etc.).
159. For a detailed description of the comprehensive and accurate forecasts and warnings issued by
the National Weather Service, beginning with a statement of the formation of the system that was to
become Katrina on August 22, 2005, see NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, SERVICE ASSESSMENT: HURRICANE KATRINA, AUGUST 23-31, 2005 (2006), available at
http://www.weather.gov/os/assessments/pdfs/Katrina.pdf.
160. See Liberian Poplar Transp., Inc., 26 Cl. Ct. at 224, 226.
161. See KNABB ET AL., supra note 2, at 1-2.
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cause element when they could have just as easily fallen under the due care
element, and vice versa. For consistency, the cases will be discussed in
terms of how the individual courts have treated the elements.
The third element of the act of God defense requires that the natural
disaster or other natural phenomenon be the sole cause of the release or
threatened release. 162 This imposes a heavy burden on a party seeking to
avoid liability, in that any factor other than the natural event that even
slightly contributed to the release will destroy this element, and conse-
quently, the entire defense. United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., as
noted above in Element One, presents a clear situation in which the natural
event, regardless of being labeled a "grave natural disaster," was not the
sole cause of the release. Recall that in the late 1970s, Alcan dumped as
much as two million gallons of oily wastes containing hazardous sub-
stances down an air shaft leading to a network of coal mines and related
tunnels bordering the Susquehanna River, and as a result of Hurricane Glo-
ria, approximately one hundred thousand gallons of the waste were dis-
charged from a tunnel into the river.163 Alcan's act of God defense was
rejected in part because "no reasonable factfinder could conclude that Hur-
ricane Gloria was the sole cause of the release and resulting response
costs. ' 164 In cases like this, the courts have been less than patient with such
a defense. The court further stated that "[t]wo million gallons of hazardous
wastes were not dumped into the borehole by an act of God, and were it not
for the unlawful disposal of this hazardous waste Hurricane Gloria would
not have flushed 100,000 gallons of this chemical soup into the Susque-
hanna River." 165 Clearly illegal acts of a PRP will be a contributing factor
to a release, destroying this element of the defense.
The acts of the PRP do not have to be illegal to defeat the sole cause
element of the defense. In Apex Oil Co., Inc. v. United States, the Missis-
sippi flooding case discussed in Element Two, the court observed that it
was Apex's conduct, not simply a strong current associated with the 1995
floods, that contributed to the collision and resulting spill. 166 Apex used an
underpowered tug which contributed to the loss of control, and the tug
captain chose to negotiate the bridge with his tug and tow, eliminating any
argument that the conditions, even if the floods were considered an act of
God, were the sole cause of the discharge.167
162. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f(1)-(3) (2000); 33 U.S.C. § 2703(a); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (2000).
163. 892 F. Supp. 648, 651 (M.D. Pa. 1995).
164. Id. at 658.
165. Id.
166. See 208 F. Supp. 2d 642, 657 (E.D. La. 2002).
167. Id. at 657-58.
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In United States v. Barrier Industries, Inc., the United States sought to
recover response costs for cleanup of a site under CERCLA, stemming
from'a spill allegedly caused by a bursting pipe resulting from "an un-
precedented cold spell."' 168 Although the cold spell may have been unusual
and damaging, in dismissing the defense the court observed that the gov-
ernment presented "substantial undisputed evidence" that numerous other
factors prior to the cold weather contributed to the problems at the Barrier
site. 169
For this and the final element, a PRP must seek to establish that its
own conduct in no way contributed to the release of oil or hazardous sub-
stances in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. The complexity surrounding each
specific release will present numerous pitfalls for the party asserting the
defense, where a single and, perhaps, unnoticed and remote contributing
factor will spell the end to any hopes of avoiding liability. This is a heavy
burden for any PRP already faced with an uphill struggle.
D. Element Four-Due Care or Foresight
The final element of the defense, related to the sole cause element, is
that the effects of the natural disaster/phenomenon "could not have been
prevented or avoided by the exercise of due care or foresight."' 170 What
amounts to due care or foresight will depend on such fact-intensive issues
as specific activities before, during, and after the event; individual facil-
ity/vessel construction and upkeep; industry standard procedures for opera-
tions and whether those procedures were followed; permits required,
permits issued, and compliance with such permits; as well as applicable
local, state, and federal laws regarding each of these issues. If it is found
that the facility/vessel did not exercise due care or foresight at any point
and the result was a release or threatened release of oil or a hazardous sub-
stance, this element will not be satisfied.
In United States v. Stringfellow, where the court decided that heavy
rains did not meet the standard of an exceptional natural phenomenon, 17 1
the defense also failed because the Stringfellow site did not exercise due
care. The court found that "any harm caused by the rain could have been
prevented through design of proper drainage channels."'172
168. 991 F. Supp. 678, 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
169. Id. at 679-80.
170. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(1) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 9601(1) (2000).
171. See supra Part 11l.A (Element One--Characterizing the Event).
172. 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1061 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
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As stated above, the sole cause and due care elements are inextricably
linked. For example, in United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., where the
party conceded to dumping hazardous waste down a mineshaft, there is
little doubt that the hurricane was not the sole cause of the subsequent re-
lease. 173 Yet it is equally clear that "exercise of due care or foresight would
have militated against dumping hazardous wastes into mine workings that
inevitably lead to such a significant natural resource as the Susquehanna
River." 174 Even if the other elements of the defense were met, this failure
to exercise due care or foresight would likely have provided sufficient rea-
son to reject Alcan's act of God assertion.
Apex Oil Co., Inc. v. United States is another case where the final two
elements overlap. Just as the flooding on the Mississippi was not the sole
cause of the spill, Apex Oil could have prevented or avoided the effects of
the flooding and associated predictably strong currents by investing in a
higher-powered tug or by deciding not to knowingly navigate into higher
and faster water with such an under-powered tug. 175
If and when PRPs face liability costs associated with a Katrina-related
release, this last element, that the effects of the natural disas-
ter/phenomenon could not have been prevented by the exercise of due care
or foresight, will present a serious challenge in meeting the already heavy
burden imposed by the first three elements. Courts have used facts such as
vessel 176 and facility 77 design, specific handling of hazardous waste, 178
and choices made during the natural event 79 to determine that the effects
of the natural disaster/phenomenon could indeed have been prevented by
exercising due care or foresight. Because there is no regulation defining
what due care or foresight is, courts have significant latitude in making this
determination, and all have leaned in favor of strict liability. While it is
clear that illegal activity such as the dumping in Alcan Aluminum will not
be seen as exercising due care or foresight, 180 it is much less clear that a
facility's poor channels would be seen as failing to meet a duty of due
173. See 892 F. Supp. 648, 658 (M.D. Pa. 1995).
174. Id.
175. See 208 F. Supp. 2d 642, 647-48 (E.D. La. 2002).
176. See id. (Apex's under-powered tug).
177. See Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. at 1061 (poor drainage at the Stringfellow site).
178. See Alcan Aluminum Corp., 892 F. Supp. at 658 (Alcan's mine shaft dumping).
179. See Apex Oil Co., Inc., 208 F. Supp. 2d at 647 (Apex's decision to navigate through higher
and faster water).
180. See 892 F. Supp. at 658.
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care. 181 In the more questionable types of case, courts may subconsciously
be making decisions based on the best overall policy choice, as will be
discussed in the final section.
PRPs will have to show that, knowing that they conduct business in an
especially hurricane-prone region, they made a concerted effort to prepare
their facility or vessel to endure a natural disaster, in addition to acting with
due care or foresight directly before, during, and after the storm. 182 Some
PRPs will surely argue that no amount of preparation or due care could
have prevented the releases from Katrina. This is a question of fact that
each case will explore. However, it will be much more difficult to prove
that they exercised foresight; given what we know about the low-lying,
hurricane-intense region, poor levees, and continued wetland loss, the bur-
den on the PRP for this element will be difficult to overcome. 183 Even be-
fore the act of God defense has been raised by the defendant, the idea
behind this element has already been questioned in the class-action Mur-
phy's Oil spill case, where plaintiffs argue that Murphy failed to exercise
due care by not properly securing a storage tank that leaked after being
181. See Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. at 1061 (finding that "any harm caused by the rain could have
been prevented through design of proper drainage channels," but failing to explain Stringfellow's duty
to maintain proper channels).
182. Another issue receiving significant attention is more than a half-century of wetland destruc-
tion, which experts agree contributed to the heightened level of destruction in Katrina. Wetlands act as
natural buffers against storm surges, where one foot of storm surge is absorbed by roughly every 2.7
miles of wetlands. Adam Cohen, The Big Easy on the Brink, TIME.COM, http://www.time.com/
time/reports/mississippi/orleans.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2006). While PRPs may argue that wetland
destruction is out of their hands, and thus they should not be responsible for its effects, there is no doubt
that they knew, or should have known, of wetland loss and cannot claim ignorance when a strong storm
surge causes greater damage.
The same arguments fail regarding the deteriorating, insufficient levies in and around New
Orleans. Public awareness of the need for levee repair has grown since Katrina, but was also a very
public issue well before the levee failure in August 2005. See DONALD T. HORNSTEIN ET AL., CTR. FOR
PROGRESSIVE REFORM, BROKEN LEVEES: WHY THEY FAILED 8, available at
http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/CPRSpecial-LeveeReport.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2006)
Much criticism has been directed at the George W. Bush administration, even from fellow Republicans.
For example, Mike Parker, a former Mississippi Congressman and the chief of the Army Corps of
Engineers until 2002, publicly stated in a Senate committee meeting that "the national interest was
being harmed" by President Bush's proposal to cut over one-third of the Corps' $6 billion budget. He
was forced to resign following the meeting. Id. at 8. While recent criticism of the Bush administration's
low prioritization of levee repair is supported by significantly reduced budget appropriations to the
Army Corps of Engineers, in reality the problem has persisted, with knowledge, throughout a number of
past administrations. Id. at 9.
Again, industries in the area are well aware of the problem, and in terms of the act of God
defense, should have exercised due care or foresight with this knowledge in hand. The industries should
have either moved to a more secure area or equipped their facilities to handle such a storm. Either way,
industries continued to operate in this region, significantly weakening the due care or foresight element
of the defense.




disrupted by floodwaters. 184 If it does not happen sooner, this element will
most likely be the breaking point of the act of God defense.
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This note has thus far focused on the legislative and judicial
interpretation of the act of God defense, supporting a very narrow
application and offering little chance of success. However, on a very real
and practical level, the policy implications associated with holding PRPs
strictly liable for the costs related to oil and hazardous waste releases
further bolster the previously narrow interpretation of the defense. Three
important policy considerations stand out in support of holding PRPs liable
for cleanup costs. First, in order to clean up sites as efficiently, effectively,
and quickly as possible, PRPs should bear the costs of cleanup, and to
maximize efficiency should step forward and lead the cleanup where
releases are attributable to them. Second, principles of equity dictate that
PRPs, or in some cases those entities in the industries associated with these
releases, should bear the cost of cleanup, instead of the general public.
Finally, there is a deterrent aspect to strict liability, whereby entities may
take steps to avoid the high costs associated with releases in the future.
Combining these policy justifications with legislative intent and judicial
interpretation, the act of God defense should not be used by PRPs to avoid
Katrina-related environmental cleanup costs.
A. Efficiency
It is imperative that the oil and toxic releases be cleaned up well, as
quickly as possible, in order to protect the health of the returning residents,
as well as the affected environment. For this reason, not only should the act
of God defense fail but, in the interest of public health and the PRP, the
most efficient solution is for the PRP to clean up the site immediately,
avoiding delay and wasting valuable time litigating the defense.
Regardless of whether (1) PRPs step forward and begin to administer
cleanup, (2) the EPA files suit against PRPs to force cleanup, or (3) the
EPA cleans up the sites and later seeks cost recovery, cleaning up the de-
struction from Hurricane Katrina will take years, possibly decades. Case in
point is the Exxon Valdez oil spill of 1989. Closing in on two decades later,
Prince William Sound, where the spill took place, has not fully recovered-
animal and plant wildlife still suffer from exposure to lingering oil, and
184. See Turner v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 597, 606-07 (E.D. La. 2006); see also Oil
Company: Katrina Spill Victims Got $50m, supra note 101.
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long-term recovery is unknown.185 Considering the Valdez was an isolated
spill, from a known party, with immediate response and financial backing,
one can only imagine the devastation and lack of progress had those facts
been different.186
Knowing that it will takes years to clean up from the numerous and
scattered releases from Katrina, and that the effects may be felt decades
down the line, clearly the most important first step is an efficient com-
mencement of the process. This means that cleanup should begin as soon as
possible, and plans should be prepared with the utmost care and considera-
tion for the health of the residents and the environment. The most efficient
mean to this end is for PRPs to step forward and bear the cost of the re-
leases for which they are responsible. A successful act of God defense
would greatly delay cleanup of polluted sites and, keeping in mind the lack
of resources in the Superfund, it could further jeopardize a safe, quick, and
effective cleanup.
If a PRP were to enter into a lengthy court battle in order to invoke the
defense, and in the end lose, overall costs would skyrocket: legal costs
would no doubt be high, but even more so, the longer the delay in cleaning
up a site, the more difficult and expensive it will probably be to achieve
suitable results. Considering the heavy burden to succeed on the defense,
the PRP, as well as the public, would benefit most by the responsible par-
ties coming forward from the beginning and initiating cleanup. In that vein,
it is in the PRP's interest to initiate the cleanup because they would have
discretion in how to proceed, and will no doubt choose a more cost-
effective plan than if the EPA organized the process and later sued the PRP
for cost recovery. In any event, if a PRP does raise the act of God defense,
principles of equity disfavor its success.
B. Equity
A second policy rationale supporting the denial of the act of God de-
fense is based in equity. Whether in the context of a site contaminated by a
known and active facility, or in orphan sites where specific responsibility is
unknown or the entity no longer exists, the fact remains that the general
public should not bear the financial burden of cleaning up contaminated
sites. 187
185. See Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Tr. Council, supra note 97.
186. See EPA, Exxon Valdez, supra note 44.
187. This is especially true when we remember the current state of CERCLA and the Superfund.
The industry taxes, known as the polluter pays taxes, that had previously kept the Superfund full, faded
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When a site is contaminated by a known source, the equitable solution
is for that source to clean up and pay for their spilled contaminants, and not
allow the act of God defense to shift the burden to the public in any but the
most extreme cases. A party may be ordered to clean up the site, or may be
sued down the line for cost recovery, and then use the act of God defense to
recover or avoid cleanup expenses. In these cases, if a court grants a PRP's
act of God defense, those responsible parties will avoid liability, placing
the financial burden on the Superfund. Considering the serious doubt as to
whether Hurricane Katrina should, in the first place, be classified under the
statutory definition of an act of God, and the current state of the Superfund,
the act of God defense is an inequitable shifting of the burden from the
responsible party to the general public. The public, especially in the af-
fected region (but also throughout the country in general), has already paid
a price for the pollution in terms of health and environmental damage. It is
unfair, almost cruel, to turn around and place the financial burden to clean
up the contamination on the public while letting the polluter off without
assuming liability.
One solution that practitioners have advocated (with varying degrees
of success) that would continue to reflect the polluter pays principle is for
the oil companies or those businesses dealing in toxic substances' 88 to in-
ternalize these costs by creating their own private cleanup "superfund" for
the annual hurricane season. 189 By implementing their own dedicated taxes,
cleanup would be funded by those associated with the oil or chemicals that
create the risk in the first place, just as it would be if the cleanup were
funded by the federal Superfund, when it was funded by dedicated taxes.
The taxes paid by the entity into the private "superfund" account may be
included as a cost of doing business and, thus, passed down to consumers.
The policy implications for denying the defense become even more appar-
ent when orphan sites are considered.
The Superfund shortfalls are greatly magnified in the context of
Katrina by the presence of possible orphan sites, those sites where the EPA
cannot identify or prove the source of the pollutant, or the responsible facil-
ity is bankrupt or no longer exists. The strong storm and floods, coupled
into the sunset in 1995, and the Superfund now derives its revenue from general taxes. RAMSEUR ET
AL., supra note 58, at 3-4.
188. As in the plethora of oil companies and businesses dealing in toxic substances that exist in the
Gulf Coast.
189. See generally James Boyd, Banking on "Green' Money": Are Environmental Financial Re-
sponsibility Rules Fulfilling Their Promises? (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 96-26, 1996),
available at http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-DP-96-26.pdf (discussing the promise of individual
financial responsibility for environmental pollution and weaknesses in the current framework).
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with the disorder after Katrina, prevented prompt investigations, so that
answering the question of who is responsible for what contamination will
surely be an arduous, long term process. In orphan sites there are no PRPs
to assign liability to (and thus no possibility of an act of God defense),
leaving no choice but to dip into the Superfund to cover cleanup costs. A
downward spiral emerges: the EPA cannot promptly and effectively carry
out removal or remedial actions at orphan sites without a properly funded
Superfund, and the Superfund cannot be properly funded without reinstat-
ing the taxes on the industries that have historically been responsible for
the releases that prompt cleanup.
The decade-long argument in favor of reinstating the dedicated taxes
gains credence by virtue of an equitable rationale: when an orphan site is in
need of cleanup, instead of the general public bearing the cost, costs should
be borne by those most closely related to the releases and those that profit
from doing business in those areas, i.e. oil and toxic/hazardous substance
handling industries in the Gulf Coast region. Without a properly funded
Superfund, a number of unacceptable risks surface: (1) available funds may
be stretched thin across the numerous sites needing response, reducing the
likelihood of appropriate cleanup at all sites; (2) lack of funds may lead to
long delays before cleanup begins; or (3) whole sites may be ignored. All
of these risks will come at the expense of human health. At the moment,
the reality is that until dedicated taxes are restored, principles of fairness
demand that the limited Superfund resources be used only for orphan sites,
and that in the absence of a bona fide act of God, an identifiable PRP
should be strictly liability for cleanup costs.
C. Deterrence
The third policy rationale for denying the act of God defense in
Katrina-related releases is related to the defense itself. The failure of a fa-
cility to exercise either due care or foresight will invalidate the act of God
defense, and thus the defense's failure may be a strong deterrent against
releases in the future. There is no question that facilities operating in the
Gulf Coast region were, or should have been, aware of the potential for
storm damage from a hurricane season that lasts roughly six months out of
the year. 190 Congress, in drafting the narrow act of God defense, took af-
firmative measures to provide for a "due care or foresight" condition: the
defense will not succeed unless "the effects of [the phenomenon] could not
190. See supra Part II.A.
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have been prevented or avoided by the exercise of due care or foresight."'19 1
This condition may be seen as both encouragement and a warning to a fa-
cility dealing with oil or hazardous substances.
First, because Congress explicitly stated that the defense will not ap-
ply unless the event's effects could not have been prevented or avoided by
due care, a facility is put on notice that it must take affirmative precautions
to avoid releases stemming from natural disasters or other natural phenom-
ena. 192 If the level of care falls below a certain standard, then the due care
element, and thus the act of God defense, should fail. Katrina may act as a
hard lesson, but a lesson nonetheless. 193 If the act of God defense is applied
narrowly and only granted in the most deserving of cases, facilities in the
Gulf Coast and throughout the country will be encouraged, even forced, to
take a hard look at their practices in anticipation of the next major event.
Every facility that manufactures, handles, treats, stores, or disposes of oil or
hazardous substances has an incentive to employ safe business practices or
risk economic disaster and social vilification. Examples of such practices
include utilizing effective control equipment and responsible management
of these substances. Facilities may also realize an incentive in reducing use
of toxic substance or in using less toxic substances, so that if an unavoid-
able event does occur, the damage, and thus their liability, will be mini-
mized.
As this note has mentioned, a question that each facility and case will
have to explore is what level of care was exercised, and whether any degree
of care could have prevented the release from occurring in a storm of
Katrina's magnitude. If a facility can prove that it did exercise a sufficient
level of care, and the release still occurred, there may be a chance at a suc-
cessful defense. The second deterrent effect, however, may also suggest,
once again, why the defense should not succeed in the first place.
Even if a facility exercised due care, a failure to exercise foresight will
be a difficult hurdle to overcome. Because no one can argue with sincerity
and a straight face that there was not a strong likelihood that hurricanes of
varying strength would hit the region, good policy suggests that those who
choose to operate in the area despite this knowledge should have to bear the
costs of cleanup when releases occur. This is a recurrent theme, discussed
above as a reason that Element Four (due care/foresight) should fail. The
191. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(1) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 9601(1) (2000).
192. This will always be a question of fact depending on, among other things, the area in question
and the type of substance being handled.
193. Katrina will be a hard lesson in a number of respects, such as the shortfalls of FEMA and the
poor federal response, the need for a better storm protection system in New Orleans, and the need to
rebuild the depleted coastal wetlands.
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risk of a massive hurricane apparently did not deter operators of chemical
facilities and oil refineries in the region from doing business prior to Hurri-
cane Katrina. However, Katrina may have opened the eyes of those who
may now bear cleanup costs, forcing decision-makers to run a careful cost-
benefit analysis of doing business in the region. This analysis will either
lead to (1) improvements in operating practices to meet a requisite level of
due care; (2) a sobering consideration of doing business in a hurricane-
prone region and a subsequent move to a safer locale to operate; or (3) no
action at all. Whatever decision these groups eventually make, the public's
interest in a safe and healthy region will only be fulfilled by denying the act
of God defense and holding these companies liable for the costs of cleaning
up their own spills.
CONCLUSION
When PRPs invoke the statutory act of God defense in the hopes of
avoiding possibly tremendous cleanup liability from oil and hazardous
waste releases surrounding Hurricane Katrina, they will find little support
from the general public and even less support from locally-affected resi-
dents. More importantly, they should find no relief from the courts. Even
before Katrina ravaged New Orleans and much of the Gulf Coast, a grow-
ing number of people, like environmental historian Ted Steinberg,
staunchly questioned how "natural" such disasters really were. 194 The opin-
ions only stiffened after Katrina; Steinberg was recently interviewed for a
Wall Street Journal online article, in which his 2000 book was again refer-
enced for the proposition that these disasters are not acts of God. Steinberg
stated, "This is an unnatural disaster if ever there was one, not an act of
God... If the potential for mass death and destruction from extreme
weather existed anywhere in the U.S., it existed in New Orleans."' 95 If this
"act of God" was seen by many as nothing short of predicted, 196 then the
statutory act of God defense found in a number of environmental stat-
utes, 197 which provides a narrow exception to strict liability, will likewise
be a poor fit. Not only does the plain language of the defense create a com-
plex design and heavy burden to overcome, but courts have been extremely
194. See STEINBERG, supra note 158.
195. Sharon Begley, Man-Made Mistakes Increase Devastation of 'Natural' Disasters, WALL ST. J.
ONLINE, Sept. 2, 2005, http://online.wsj.com/public/us (internal quotations omitted).
196. For an eerie prediction of a Katrina-like hurricane apocalypse in New Orleans, see Joel K.
Bourne, Jr., Gone with the Water, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC MAG., Oct. 2004, available at
http://magma.nationalgeographic.com/ngn0410/feature5/?fs=www3.nationalgeographic.com.




weary of parties wishing to use the defense to skirt their financial responsi-
bilities. Furthermore, national policy considerations favor PRP liability in
the event of oil or chemical spills.
Of the four main elements of the defense, only the first element, which
considers the size and gravity of the event, is likely to be satisfied in the
context of Katrina. As to the second element, the storm was not unantici-
pated. Advanced tracking watched the storm form eleven days before Flor-
ida landfall (and at least thirteen days before Louisiana landfall), and the
Gulf Coast is a well-known hot-spot for tropical storm activity. The final
two elements, that the phenomenon must be the sole cause of the release
(Element Three) and that the effects could not have been prevented or
avoided by the exercise of due care or foresight (Element Four), will be
very fact-intensive inquiries into the facility's conduct. Precedent has been
quick to point out the multitude of evidence that may exist to demonstrate
that a party did not use due care or foresight, and thus that the act of God
was not the sole cause of the release. In order for the defense to ever suc-
ceed, an extremely unlikely set of events would have to occur, where all
four elements are satisfied in a single case-and that would be the true act
of God.
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